Merkley, Markey act to prevent nuclear arms race in West Asia

from Sen. Jeff Merkley

Oregon’s U.S. Sen. Jeff Merkley—a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—and Massachusetts’ U.S. Sen. Edward J. Markey introduced a Joint Resolution of Disapproval (JRD) Oct. 15 that gives the Senate an opportunity to debate and vote on the proposed U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal before it goes into effect.

Under federal law, the agreement will go into effect after a 90-day congressional review period, unless Congress passes a JRD. The Merkley-Markey JRD sets up a vote for the Senate to consider the resolution after Nov. 29.

“Giving Saudi Arabia access to U.S. civilian nuclear energy technology without ironclad protections to make sure it doesn’t provide a foundation for a nuclear bomb is unacceptable. It is essential that nations pursuing civilian energy programs agree to the ‘gold standard’ of restrictions on fuel reprocessing and enrichment and rigorous inspections to ensure that a nuclear energy program doesn’t become a covert nuclear weapons program,” said Merkley.

“We can’t sleepwalk into a decision this consequential. The law gives Congress the power to review and block a deal like this, and the Senate will now have the chance to fulfill its statutory responsibility before it’s too late.”

“The U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal is about megatons, not megawatts. Trump should not be sharing nuclear bomb technology with a nation that U.S. intelligence says may want nuclear weapons. Even worse, the deal fails to meet the nonproliferation Gold Standard, by allowing Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium, an essential step to producing a bomb, but not requiring the strongest international inspections. This deal is the starting gun for a Middle East nuclear arms race. Congress must reject it,” said Markey.

If enacted, the Merkley-Markey JRD would block the Trump Administration’s U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement, referred to as a “123 agreement.” The current agreement lacks two critical components necessary to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

The first is the “gold standard” for 123 agreements, which requires that a nation forego reprocessing of spent fuel and the enrichment of uranium to create nuclear fuel. Enrichment and reprocessing facilities create a significant infrastructure for the development of a nuclear weapons program.

The second is a requirement that a nation sign on to the Additional Protocol, which turns the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from accountants into investigators that can make sure that a nation is not pursuing development of a nuclear weapon.

If a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia proceeds without the “gold standard” and the Additional Protocol, it raises significant risks.

One risk is that Saudi Arabia will pursue a covert nuclear weapons program.

A second risk is that the United Arab Emirates, which agreed to both the “gold standard” and the Additional Protocol, could opt out of those requirements because its 123 agreement allows the UAE to renegotiate if the U.S. gives another Middle East state a more favorable deal.

A third is that Iran would undoubtedly reject any future restriction on its nuclear program that Saudi Arabia had not been held to.

Taken together, these factors significantly raise the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation and the possibility of future conflicts in a nuclear-armed world.

Previously, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the same leader that U.S. intelligence found approved the operation to kill journalist Jamal Khashoggi, said that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, then Saudi Arabia will develop one as well. Despite public reporting indicating that President Trump would mandate Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel as part of the agreement, there is also no formal mention of this requirement in the deal.

Merkley began his career in public service as a nuclear weapons policy analyst at the Pentagon and the Congressional Budget Office and has been sounding the alarm over the U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal.

He has partnered with Markey—as a fellow co-chair of the bicameral Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group—to press the Trump Administration on its secrecy surrounding the agreement and slam the deal as reckless.